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The Franc Zone rests on an original m echanism, the  compte d'opération (CO).  This 
account gives the CFA a credible external convertibility backed by the French Treasury. We 
argue that the monetary policy imposed by the  CO aims at balancing external accounts, in a 
manner inspired by the monetary approach of the balance of payments. This feature and the 
fixed nominal exchange rate identify the zone with a convertibility regime. Using a co-
integration model adapted for panel data, we test the sensitivity of the money supply to 
external accounts in order to infer the  CO  efficiency for implementing external monetary 
adjustment. An incidental question also appears: what are the consequences of the 1994 
devaluation for the nature of the regime? We adapt our test to obtain the difference between 
the ante- and the post-devaluation periods. We conclude that the zone behaves as a 
convertibility regime and that the devaluation reinforces, instead of weakens, its nature.  
 
 
Keywords: Franc Zone, compte d'opération, 1994 devaluation, panel unit roots test, panel co-
integration model.  
 





La Zone Franc est fondée sur un mécanisme original : le Compte d'Opérations. Ce 
compte donne au Franc CFA une convertibilité externe crédible, soutenue par le Trésor 
Français. Nous faisons l'hypothèse que la politique monétaire mise en place par le Compte 
d'Opérations vise à équilibrer les soldes extérieurs. Cette caractéristique et le taux de change 
fixe identifient la Zone au régime de convertibilité. Grâce à  un modèle de co-intégration, 
adapté au panel, nous évaluons la sensibilité de la base monétaire aux comptes externes de 
manière à en déduire l'efficacité du Compte d'Opérations pour mettre en place un ajustement 
monétaire des soldes extérieurs. Une question incidente se pose alors, quelle conséquence la 
dévaluation de 1994 peut-elle avoir eu sur la nature du régime ? Nous adaptons notre test de 
manière à évaluer  la réaction avant et après 1994. Nos tests nous donnent  la conviction que 
la Zone Franc est b ien un régime de convertibilité et que la dévaluation, au lieu d'affaiblir le 
régime, l'a renforcé. 
 
mots clé : Zone Franc, Compte d'Opérations, dévaluation de 1994, test de racine unitaire en 
panel, modèle de co-intégration en panel. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.24 
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1.  Introduction. 
 
Since the 1994 devaluation, some people maintain that the zone has lost its soul, and 
contest its nature as a fixed exchange regime. In addition, well before the events of 1994, they 
often cast doubt on the regime’s discipline, arguing that the French support  is without cost 
because of the small amounts involved. We contest this view, and we argue that the Zone, 
despite the devaluation, has remained a genuine convertibility regime.  
Our conviction is based on the compte d'opérations function. This tool is driven by a set 
of institutional rules shared by the member countries of the CFA union and France. We argue 
that these rules rest on the monetary approach of the balance of payments. Consequently, they 
influence monetary policy following the external position o f the Zone in order to balance 
external accounts, as in other convertibility regimes i.e. currency boards. 
Two debates are thus in question: is the Franc Zone a convertibility regime or not? And 
what is the impact of the 1994 devaluation on monetary policy? In order to acquire evidence, 
we test the convergence hypothesis between the base money and external position in the Zone 
using a co-integration model adapted for panel data. The main idea is to obtain evidence about 
the efficiency of the  compte d'opérations in making base money significantly dependent on 
the reserve. In addition, we split our sample into two periods, post and ante-devaluation; in 
this way we can quote the modification of monetary policy due to devaluation. 
  In the first section, we briefly expose the convertibility regime adjustment mechanism 
in order to present the balance of payments monetary explanation. In the second section, we 
describe the history of the  compte d'opérations and its present features in order to link this 
institution  with the monetary approach presented in the first section. Finally, we present our 
econometric test. 
 
2.  Monetary explanation of the balance of payments. 
 
Economists studying the Gold Exchange and the Gold Exchange Standard systems (GEs), 
in use at the end of the XIX
th and the beginning of the XX
th, century elaborated the monetary 
explanation of the balance of payments. The topic thus has a deep theoretical background 
(Rist 1938, Friedman 1969). This theoretical support could easily be used to analyse a 
convertibility regime such as the Franc Zone.  
Basically, the GEs provide two adjustment mechanisms. First of all, the GEs rule the 
money supply. Suppose that, worldwide, money is fully or partially backed by a metal 
commodity. The new issues are, thus, constrained by metal production. In case of a money 
demand increase, the money supply cannot increase with the demand. Two reactions are 
expected. First, the production of the commodity money, that is to say the metal mining and 
minting, increases and hence consumes labour and capital. If metal production is perfectly 
elastic, all the commodity money demand is satisfied. However, capital and labour are evicted 
by the metal production from the remainder of the economy that supposes an increase in the 
price of these  factors and a slowing down of the growth rate, which reduces the growth of 
money demand. However, as the production of metals is not perfectly elastic, the main part of 
the adjustment will take the form either of a currency revaluation, that is to say a fall in prices 
or the form of a quantity adjustment resulting in depression. Both phenomena reduce the 
money demand growth. The success of this kind of adjustment rests on price flexibility, and 
historically we notice cases of rapid growth and deflation (Friedman 1969). But in the case of 
price rigidity, as for example wage rigidities, the GE could be recessive. The commodity 
money, when the commodity is a metal, thus demonstrated some clear drawbacks due to the 
money supply’s strong inelasticity. The present convertibility regimes always tightly regulate CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.24 
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the money supply, but the "commodity" which backs the issues is now a foreign currency. 
The "commodity production sector" is, thus, no longer mining and minting of a scarce metal, 
but all economic activity able to provide currency, that is to say export and finance. These 
regimes give an incentive to develop outward-looking industries, goods, services and finance,.  
Secondly, in the classic GE, and even more so the GES, all countries in the world are not 
necessarily gold or silver producers. The main part of the national metal stock variations is 
due to trade and finance. Thus the GE also rests on an external adjustment. Hume (1752) and 
Cantillon (1755) first exposed this adjustment. A price growth greater than international 
inflation leads to a loss in competitiveness. Consequently, the balance of payments will shows 
deficits. These deficits mean an exit of money commodity; the flow of commodity provokes a 
reduction in the base money. The reduction of the money base leads to a slow-down of 
inflation, indeed deflation, in order to restore the balance of payments equilibrium. In this 
way, the GE assumes the role of an automatic balance of payments adjustment mechanism. 
The present convertibility regimes are, thus, supposed to provide the same mechanism. In 
currency boards, the use of foreign currency to back local issue concentrates all the monetary 
policy mechanism on the balance of payments adjustment. In the case of the Franc Zone, there 
is no backing rule to institutionalise a balance of payments adjustment mechanism. However, 
institutional rules regulate the  compte d'opération which represents the balance of payments 
of the Zone. The institutional rules applicable in the Zone aim at balancing this account, thus 
equilibrating the balance of payments. We may thus find in the two regimes a similar 
monetary policy aimed at adjusting the external accounts.  
In particular, as in a currency board regime, the base money stock and the base money 
supply have to be clearly influenced by the stock of foreign reserves and the flux of foreign 
reserves. In the fourth section, in order to test this assumption, we provide an empirical test 
used in previous studies (Combes and Veyrune 2002) to evaluate the monetary policies of 
currency boards. The next section describes the unusual tool used by the Zone to ensure 
convertibility: the compte d'opérations.  
 
3.  The compte d'opérations. 
 
For the Franc Zone, everything begins in 1878 in Algeria (Lelart 1996). At that time, the 
French and B ritish were running empires which constituted vast commercial and financial 
structures. The money and exchange problems were puzzling. French Francs and Pounds 
Sterling were commodity money, based on gold, silver or both metals. This kind of money 
was scarce and hardly exportable. To facilitate exchange dependent territories were strongly 
encouraged to found Colonial Banks, mainly metropolitan private commercial bank branches, 
which were empowered to manage colonial issues. However, the exchange stability,  indeed 
the convertibility, of colonial issue into metropolitan issue was not guaranteed. To solve the 
convertibility problem, the British, following currency school principles, imposed a 100% 
backing rule to colonial issue. However, instead of backing the  issue with commodities such 
as the metropolitan issue they backed colonial issue with sterling, insuring by the way the 
colonial money convertibility in sterling. 
The French administration’s response to the same difficulty was significantly different 
from  the British method. French colonial administrators acted in a more empirical way. 
Indeed, the custom ensured that the French migrants in Algeria were used to transferring 
funds across Mediterranean by the mean of postal orders. The migrants simply bought a postal 
order with Algerian bank bills in a Constantine, Oran or Algiers postal agency and sent it by 
mail to Marseilles. The receiver, in France, mandated by the order cashed it in a French postal 
agency. The receiver simply sold the note for French Francs. To avoid the conversion of 
Algerian Francs and French Francs, the Treasury systematically provided the post office with CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.24 
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French Francs in exchange for its net balance in Algerian Francs. Indeed, the post office made 
the compensation between trans-Mediterranean payments. As we can imagine, a rapidly 
growing territory such as Algeria experienced a greater exiting flux (towards the metropolis) 
than entering flux, that is to say the territory experienced a balance of payments deficit. 
Because of these balance of payments deficits, the postal account for compensation allowed a 
net balance in Algerian Francs to occur, accumulated by the French Treasury.  
The intervention of the Treasury to avoid the exchange between Algerian and French 
Francs was still just an  ad hoc  solution. The main drawback of it was that no method was 
forecast to regulate the balance of payments deficit, that is to say the Treasury contribution. 
At the beginning, the Treasury advance represented such a small amount in comparison to the 
French Franc monetary aggregates that the Treasury could at a small cost provide any French 
Francs that Algeria needed. However, as soon as the Algerian Franc position of the Treasury 
increased, there was a demand for an adjustment mechanism of this account to  be 
implemented. The Treasury simply made a deposit of its Algerian issue position in the 
Algerian (Central) Bank accounts; as a result, the balance of payments deficit became an 
outstanding debt for the bank. The banks of issue and the commercial banks were regulated 
by some statutory rules. In particular, the overall liability of a bank of issue could not exceed 
one third of the metallic reserve (commodity money in gold). In the case of commercial 
banks, the statutes indicated that the total amount of liability couldn't exceed one third of the 
bank’s equity. The Bank of Algeria was both a bank of issue and a commercial bank, it was 
thus ruled by the two rules of "one third". As the balance of payments belonged to the bank 
liability because of the Treasury a ccount, the status of the bank led to a monetary policy 
regulation aimed at limiting the balance of payments deficit, that is to say the Treasury 
interventions. In addition to the statutory rule, the fact that the bank governor was appointed 
by the French  administration ensured that the bank board would take care of the Treasury 
account equilibrium by adapting its monetary policy in order to adjust the external accounts. 
In exchange, the Treasury provided unlimited access to French Francs in order to make any 
payment from the territory. Indeed, the Treasury extracted the Algerian Franc from the 
exchange market. The convertibility of Algerian Francs into French Francs was guaranteed by 
the French administration at a known and fixed rate. The French Franc was convertible, thus 
the issue of the Bank of Algeria via the French Franc gained a complete convertibility. In 
addition, the Treasury committed itself never to demand a redemption of the advances. The 
French administration attained the same goal as the British administration but by different 
means: the “Treasury account” which later took the name of  compte d'opérations; instead of 
the 100% backing rule.  
The  compte d'opération was spread all over the French Empire
1 and disappeared with 
independence. The only  place where it remained effective was Equatorial and Western Africa. 
The newly independent former French colonies of Africa had preserved their common 
currency, the French CFA, divided into two monetary unions following the colonial monetary 
partage: the  Union Monetraire Ouest Africaine and the Communauté Monetaire d’Afrique 
Centrale. Now, the management of the monetary policy for the unions is completely assumed 
by two regional Central Banks with only the friendly participation of the French authorities. 
The currency unions are independent from foreigners. On the contrary, the exchange regime is 
still based on the  compte d'opérations which assumes the participation of the French 
Treasury. The mechanism has seen little change since 1878; the  compte d'opérations is now 
managed on the Treasury accounts and the regulation, formerly implicit, is today explicitly 
included in an agreement drawn up between France and the countries in the Zone. The 
agreement, called  conventions de cooperation, aims at legalising the  former practices 
governing  the compte d’opération management. In particular, the  conventions  specify the 
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rights and the duties of each partner. The French Treasury guarantees the convertibility of the 
CFA into Euros. This guarantee is characterised by three terms (Vinay 1988) 
-  the advances made by the Treasury to African Regional Bank are unlimited; 
-  the advance is permanent. In any case, the French administration can demand to be 
refunded its advances; 
-  the advance is mutual, meaning that the partners have the same status. 
In the absence of a staff appointed by the Treasury running the monetary institution of the 
Zone, the equilibrium of the  compte d'opération has been devolved to legal rule curbing the 
monetary policy if the deficit of this account, that is t o say the balance of payments deficit, 
increases. These rules, which are in fact monetary policy rules, are called  clauses de 
sauvegardes. They are numerous and are frequently revived. We quote only the most 
significant ones which effectively drive the monetary policy. 
-  A permanent minimum reserve of 20% of the total liabilities is required. An 
appropriate monetary policy has to be implemented in order to preserve at least this 
ratio. 
-  In the case of more than 3 months of account deficits, the refunding provided by the 
Central Bank is automatically reduced by 20%. 
-  The Central Banks are not allowed to provide the local Treasury with more than 20% 
of the state fiscal revenue of the previous year. 20% of fiscal revenue is a stock of 
advances to which a state is eligible; above this ratio no new advances are available. 
These rules are examples of a set of arrangements aimed at tightening monetary policy in 
case of a deficit in the compte d'opérations. If the situation becomes severe, the set of rules is 
implemented automatically by the Central Bank. Any deviation from the application of the 
rule needs the unanimity of the board; France thus has the right of veto.  
 
In British colonies, the currency boards had a 100% backing rule; we can thus say that the 
issues of t he board were endogenously convertible (Lelard 1996). This kind of convertibility 
is called endogenous because the board keeps in reserve the currency necessary to redeem all 
its issues. The Franc Zone doesn't impose such a backing rule; the currency needed to 
facilitate convertibility is provided by a credible external body, the French Treasury, which 
acts as an external “lender” on demand. The convertibility is, thus, said to be external. 
Whatever the nature of the convertibility, both regimes propose a p ermanent and unlimited 
convertibility and they are thus called regimes of convertibility. Both regimes are based on 
two adjustment mechanisms presented below. This regulation is inspired by the monetary 
explanation of the balance of payments. The next section empirically tests the efficiency of 
the compte d'opérations to run monetary policy on the monetary approach side to the balance 
of payments. 
 
Before describing the empirical procedure, we need to have some idea of the 
consequences of devaluation on the regime. The main consequence is the change in the 
exchange rate between the CFA Francs and French Francs. On January 1
st 1994, twice as 
many CFA Francs were required for a given amount in French Francs. The CFA was 
devalued by fifty percent. This devaluation was the first and only one since the CFA creation 
in 1948. So the exchange rate has not been completely constant during this period, as is 
assumed for a convertibility regime. However, the zone performances in terms of nominal 
exchange rate stability are outstanding: from 1948 to 1994, more than 45 years, there was no 
devaluation. Since 1994, the devalued exchange rate has remained firmly stable. No country 
in the world can match this performance. In addition, the status of the zone did not forecast 
that the exchange rate would be inalienable: the exchange rate had a fixed but adjustable CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.24 
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level. In 1994 the countries of the zone, in collaboration with France, simply used this legal 
possibility. 
In other aspects, the events of 1994 had little effect: the  compte d'opération stayed in 
action as before, the Central Bank statutes was not changed and the CFA continued to benefit 
from external convertibility at a fixed exchange rate. In the following section, we test the 
impact of devaluation on monetary policy and the nature of the regime. Our assumption is that 
devaluation does not weaken the regime.  
 
4.  Empirical test. 
 
Firstly in this section, we test the existence of a long-term relationship between base 
money and the external currency position. A significant l ong-term relationship infers the 
existence of a stable money-currency equilibrium. Secondly, we estimate the short term 
dynamics in order to highlight the place of reserve variation in money supply determination.  
 
4.1. A co-integration relationship between base money and the external currency 
position arising from the FZ rules.  
The Franc Zone is quite a long experience (1956-2002). The Zone is composed of 
fourteen countries in Western and Central Africa. We select the thirteen countries, which have 
belonged to the Zone since 1985
2. We use monthly data for the period (1985:M8 – 2001:M7). 
The panel is balanced.  
Formally, we can write the co-integration or the long-run relationship between base 
money and external balance as: 
 
M0i,t = b.Xi,t + ei,t  (1) 
 
M0i,t, is the base money at time t for country i. It is the part of the money aggregate on 
which the monetary authorities have a monopoly of issue. The series are provided by the 
international financial statistics (IFS), December 2001. We use the ratio between the  M0 
aggregate and the GDP. Such a ratio allows us to have a more homogenous indicator to 
compare M0 variations between countries. 
Xi,t   represents the amount of currency reserve belonging to the monetary authorities of 
the country  i at time  t. This variable represents the aggregate assumed to conduct the 
monetary policy in the Zone. The data on reserves are extracted from IFS December 2001. 
We use the ratio of the external position to the GDP. X i,t represents the stock of foreign assets 
residing in the country on each date. We note that this evaluation of foreign assets is the 
foreign asset available to the Central Banks; only a part of the stock of foreign assets belongs 
to the board. 
ei,t is the usual disturbance term for country i at time t. 
b is the coefficient of the long-term relationship between base money and the stock of 
foreign assets. The Zone 's rules don't define any particular relationship between base money 
and foreign reserves. We assume that the monetary policy of the Zone is directed to ensure a 
long-run equilibrium of the  compte d'opération, and thus of the balance of payments. This 
balance of payments equilibrium means a currency money ratio which converges toward a 
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stable long-term equilibrium. We could not, therefore, pre-determine the value of  b. We 
assume, however, that the coefficient has to be strongly significant and inferior to one: 
significant, because the reserves have to lead the monetary policy if a real balance of 
payments mechanism exists; inferior to one, because the reserve is only a part of the Central 
Bank base money counterpart. In the case of no balance of payments problem, variables other 
than the external position could change the base money. 
Firstly, we test the order of integration of M0 (base money), and of the country’s 
external position, with a specific unit root test adapted for panel: Maddala and Wu (1999) test 
based Dickey-Fuller statistics. Secondly, we provide an estimation of the long-run 
relationship between base money and the external position assumed in currency board 
regimes. 
 
Unit root tests. 
The unit root tests have been criticised because of their low power. But in maximising 
the asymptotic proprieties, the panel significantly improves the power of these tests. 
Nevertheless, the panel data structure leads  to some specific problems: individual 
heterogeneity and cross-sectional correlation (Banerjee, 1999).  
 
Maddala and Wu (1999) update a test developed by Fischer (1932) based on the p-
values combination of augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. The p-values are estimated for 
each country. They depend on the chosen distribution of the test; here we use the MacKinnon 
distributions. Hence, the MW statistics indicate the global significance of unit root 
estimations among countries. It is a non-parametric test, robust to different lag lengths and 
particularly well-suited for unbalanced panel. In practice, the MW method can be applied with 
any number of lags and any temporal or individual panel dimensions. The test also relaxes the 
assumption of cross-sectional independence. It is, therefore, particularly attractive.  
The MW test can be formulated for each variable yi,t as:  
 
Dyi,t =ai  + riyi,t-1 + S
k
j=1 qiDyi,t-j + ei,t  (2) 
 
ri are the unit root parameters estimated for each country.  
The p-values of ri (pi ) are computed to obtain the MW statistic
3: 
 
MW stat = -2S1
nln(pi) a c
2(2n)  (3) 
 
The test gives the significance for all  ri . If the MW statistic reveals that the ri are not 
significant as a whole, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a collective unit root in the 
panel. 
The results are presented in table 1. 
                                                                 




Statistics for a MW test of panel collective unit root. 
MacKinnon distribution  Base money  Foreign exchange reserves  
Benin  0.846  0.2224 
Burkina Faso  0.2293  0.1465 
Cameroon  0.9375  0.0104 
Chad  0.1138  0.3522 
Congo  0.0212  0.9967 
Equatorial Guinea  0.6  0.8198 
Gabon  0.12  0.14 
Ivory Coast  0.0461  0.28 
Mali  0.3685  0.604 
Niger  0.4053  0.116 
Central African Republic  0.5464  0.6804 
Senegal  0.3508  0.5731 
Togo  0.45  0.4811 
MW F-test 
H0 : all ri are not different from 0 
Critical value 5% : 38.9 
Critical value 10% : 35.6 
35.5  33.6 
 
This test is not able to reject the null hypothesis of collective unit root in the two 
variables, c.f. table 1. Hence, the base money and the external position are not means 
reverting, but they are stochastically non-stationary. The presence of unit root means that the 
two aggregates suffer shocks non-perfectly corrected from period to period: the shocks have 
permanent effects. In effect, most macro-economic aggregates are likely to follow such a 




Once established, the bi-variate the long-run relation could be described in three ways as 
follows:  
 
(1) All the countries across the panel a re supposed to have the same behaviours thus the 
coefficients are identical: 
 
M0i,t = a + d.t + b.Xi,t + ei,t  (4) 
 
(2) This specification is probably too restrictive. So, if we assume that the panel is 
heterogeneous, we can allow the coefficients to vary from country to country:  
 
M0i,t = ai + di.t + bi.Xi,t + ei,t  (5) 
 
(3) In the last case, the panel structure is inappropriate: the use of the panel supposes some 
homogeneity among country behaviours in order to enable the estimation. In the case of a 
CB, the monetary authorities’ means of intervention are regulated so we can assume the 
country’s behaviours to be quite homogenous and their slopes to be close together. Our 
specification supposes the homogeneity of the slope b for all countries. However, we keep CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.24 
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the  individual specific intercepts to allow for a certain heterogeneity among individuals 
due to the great diversity of country types in our sample, except for the use of the CB 
system. In addition, we introduce a trend in order to control for a determinist component 
which differs between base money and the external position (stochastic co-integration). 
Moreover, we allow this trend to vary across countries. Thus, this trend is country-
specific. The sustainability of the exchange rate regime supposes not only a  co-integration 
relationship, but also a negative or non-significant  di (equation x). Indeed, in the opposite 
case, a positive and significant trend, we would observe a deterministic deviation between 
the two aggregates. 
 
M0i,t = ai + dit + b.Xi,t + ei,t  (6) 
 
In order to control for a likely residual auto-correlation we add a first order residual 
correlation, such as  
 
M0i,t = ai + dit + b.Xi,t + ( ei,t + rei,t-1 )  (7) 
 
to the fixed effect model previously presented.  
In the absence of other comprehensive co-integration tests, we use the estimation of r 
as a proxy for residual unit root evaluation. We know that the presence of a residual unit root 
is the sign of a co-integration failure. The model estimates the first order residual auto-
correlation by a two-step method and provides a Durbin-Watson derived statistic
4. 
 
The following table gives the estimation of the equation (7). 
 
                                                                 
4 We also run a Maddala Wu test on residuals in order to check the presence of unit root (Choi 2001) not 
presented in the present article. The test rejects the hypothesis of residuals non stationarity i.e .no individual 
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Table 2. 
Engle Granger long-term relationship. Equation 7. 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression 
Base money       Number of 
observations = 2203 
R
2 = 0.26    slope    P-Values 
  Reserves  0.55    0.0 
  Benin  -0.000114    0.321 
  Burkina Faso  0.0001433    0.199 
  Cameroon  0.000206    0.387 
  Chad  -0.0002265    0.094 
  Congo  0.000092    0.568 
  Equatorial Guinea  -0.00034    0.002 
  Gabon  0.0002419    0.076 
  Ivories Coast  -0.0002801    0.01 
  Mali  -0.0001543    0.168 
  Niger  -0.0001087    0.333 
  CAR  0.0001197    0.387 
  Senegal  -0.00109    0.0 
  Togo  -0.0000107    0.92 
  Devaluation   0.025    0.0 
  Intercept  0.064    0.0 
Residual first order correlation  r = 0.85       
 
The long-run estimation fits well with the model assumption, i.e. table 2: the slope of 
reserve is strongly significant, positive and inferior to one. The significance of this slope 
confirms the important role played by the balance of payments, or the external position in 
implementing monetary policy. On the contrary, we note that the model explains only 30% of 
the base money supply variance. Indeed, reserves are not the only base money counterpart in 
the Zone. Out of  compte d'opérations deficit periods, the central bank acts freely; in particular 
it is able to accept private and (limited) public counterparts for base money. For the same 
reason, the base money is under-sensitive to reserve fluctuations. Indeed, in a crisis situation, 
the regulation of the  compte d'opérations doesn't forecast explicit base money variation 
corresponding to reserve variations. The residual first order correlation is quite high but 
inferior to one, 0.85; that gives some evidence of the absence of unit root in residuals, thus of 
co-integration relationship validity. A significant first order correlation could be due to 
omitted variable determining base money supply previously recalled. Some individual 
specific time trends are significant. They reveal country-specific evolution, some towards a 
more restrictive policy i.e. Senegal, Chad, Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea, probably due to 
deep economic crisis. Another country, Gabon, experiences a positive trend, probably due to 
petroleum activity. These trends, positive or negative, constitute deviation from the panel 
long-run equilibrium: we obtain a stochastic co-integration with deterministic deviations. The 
situation is puzzling because it means that the Zone doesn't converge toward a coherent 
monetary policy. Consequently, this trend supports people who argue that the Franc Zone 
system is an inefficient tool.  
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.24 
  12
 
However, we note a significant and positive effect of the devaluation, i.e. dummy 
variable devaluation, which takes the value 0 after the devaluation. We thus choose to run the 
model again, but for two separate periods: 1985-1994 and 1994-2001. 
 
Table 3. 
Engle Granger long-term relationship after the 1994 devaluation. Equation 7. 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression 
Base money       Number of 
observation=890 
R
2 = 0.40    slope    P-Values 
  Reserves  0.52    0.0 
  Benin  -0.0000814    0.53 
  Burkina Faso  -0.000023    0.855 
  Cameroon  0.00026    0.146 
  Chad  0.0002817    0.113 
  Congo  -0.0001342    0.71 
  Equatorial Guinea  -0.0001033    0.45 
  Gabon  0.0000878    0.62 
  Ivory Coast  -0.000115    0.40 
  Mali  -0.001002    0.42 
  Niger  -0.0002141    0.10 
  CAR  0.0003106    0.085 
  Senegal  -0.0005    0.0 
  Togo  0.0000254    0.84 
  Intercept  0.053    0.0 
Residual first order correlation  r = 0.75       
 
Table 4. 
Engle Granger long-term relationship before the 1994 devaluation. Equation 7. 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression 
Base money       Number of 
observation=1300 
R
2 = 0.15    slope    P-Values 
  Reserves  0.49    0.0 
  Benin  0.012    0.0 
  Burkina Faso  0.0003    0.015 
  Cameroon  0.000085    0.49 
  Chad  0.0002817    0.113 
  Congo  -0.00000005    0.96 
  Equatorial Guinea  -0.001742    0.0 
  Gabon  0.0000681    0.58 
  Ivory Coast  -0.0005571    0.0 
  Mali  0.0000578    0.65 
  Niger  0.000292    0.10 
  CAR  0.0003106    0.085 
  Senegal  0.000667    0.0 
  Togo  -0.0002148    0.088 
  Intercept  0.053    0.0 
Residual first order correlation  r = 0.67       
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The model performs better after the 1994 devaluation: it explains a greater part of the 
variance and all trends become non-significant
5 c.f. tables 3 and 4. We infer from this simple 
test that our model performs better after the 1994 devaluation. As our model assumes that the 
Franc  Zone aims at equilibrating the balance of payments via the  compte d'opérations, we 
conclude that there was a strengthening of the Zone's rules after devaluation. The coefficient 
is marginally higher in the post-devaluation period; we therefore infer that the long 
equilibrium is quite stable across the periods.  
 
4.2  Short-term dynamics and the strengthening of the Zone’s monetary policy. 
We could imagine that, due to various internal and external shocks, the base money 
would tend to deviate from its long-term relationship with the country’s external position, 
defined in equation (7). However, contrary to other monetary regimes, the FZ system allows 
for a mechanism which sends the base money back to its long-run correspondence with Zone 
external assets (proxy of the country’s external position). This mechanism defines an error 
correction model close to that presented by Engle and Granger (EG) (1987). The EG method 
has often been criticised; above all it demonstrates a very poor performance on a small 
sample
6. It is also particularly sensitive to the presence of omitted variables. The rule-based 
model may bring a correct specification moreover; the use of a fixed effects model catches the 
effect of time-invariant characteristics
7.  
The dynamic short-run relationship could be written as: 
 
DM0i,t = ai + b.DXi,t + s.(ei,t-1) + ( ei,t + rei,t)  (8) 
 
b gives the dynamic between the base money supply and the reserve variations. b is 
considered to be constant across countries. s is the coefficient of the error correction term. It 
gives the rate of convergence of the model to its long-term equilibrium. We assume a 
relatively slow convergence due to the gradual aspect of the CO  adjustment mechanism. If  s 
is significantly  -1<s< 0 , the model is convergent on the long-run equilibrium defined in (7). If 
s is not different from 0, the model would not converge on an equilibrium. According to the 
Granger theorem, co-integrated variables always converge. A significant convergence 
coefficient s is thus the indicator of a correct co-integration specification. 
The following table presents the short term dynamics for the period 1985-2001. 
 
                                                                 
5 Except for Senegal, it remains significantly negative. 
6 For the present study, we have at our disposal quite a wide panel: 2203 observations. 
7 Other methods have been developed in the area of co-integration, such as the one-step procedure or the Henry 
method. They both present bias consisting in lagged dependent variable endogeneity in a panel specification. 
Assessing respective bias of the methods, we prioritise the EG procedure. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.24 
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Table 5.  
Engle Granger short-run dynamics. Equation (8). 




  Coef.  P-Value 
   
Dxi,t   0.61  0.000 
(ei,t-1)  -0.06  0.000 
   
 r = -0.045   
 
Both coefficients are strongly significant and the residuals first order correlation is 
null. We infer the existence of an error correction mechanism driving the monetary policy in 
order to respect a certain base money / external position ratio. However, the convergence rate 
is slow: 6% of the deviation is corrected each period. As we use monthly data, it takes 12 
months to completely adjust to a deviation. The slowness of the adjustment process could, 
again, support the inefficiency of the Zone’s institutions to run monetary policy. 
  To investigate this question further, we ran our model on ante and post-devaluation 
periods, as for the long-run equilibrium. Again the results are quite interesting. 
 
Table 6.  
Engle Granger short-run dynamics after the 1994 devaluation. Equation (8). 




  Coef.  P-Value 
   
Dxi,t   0.50  0.000 
(ei,t-1)  -0.16  0.000 
   
 r = -0.18   
 
Table 7. 
Engle Granger short-run dynamics after the 1994 devaluation. Equation (8). 




  Coef.  P-Value 
   
Dxi,t   0.79  0.000 
(ei,t-1)  -0.058  0.000 
   
 r = -0.09   
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  As for the long-run, the model better  fits post-devaluation in every aspect. In 
particular, the rate of convergence, which was slow before devaluation, at 5.8%, became quite 
high, 16% after devaluation. Consequently, instead of twelve and a half months needed to 
adjust a deviation before 1994, we need only four and a half months after 1994. This test 
provides other evidence of the strengthening of the monetary policy after the devaluation. In 
particular, the external account monetary adjustment, which is based on the  CO, a 
fundamental feature of the Zone , appears to be more efficient after the devaluation. 
 
5.  Conclusion. 
 
The money supply in the Franc  Zone is effectively managed to a significant extent by the 
external position. This feature infers that the  compte d'opération is an efficient tool  for 
adapting monetary policy to the balance of payments or external position situation. This 
mechanism, as a central part of the Zone’s monetary policy, is clear evidence of the Zone’s 
being a convertibility regime. It would now be interesting to compare t he different 
convertibility regimes, especially the currency boards and the Franc Zone, to assess their 
respective performance in terms of external position objectives. 
Another interesting finding of this work is the strengthening of the Zone’s principle a fter 
the devaluation. Some might see the devaluation as a denial of the Zone’s basic principle. On 
the contrary, this event seems to revive the spirit of the Zone. Indeed, our model, which is 
close to the genuine basic function of the CO fits better after the devaluation than before. We 
could thus infer that, far from signalling the abandonment of fixed exchange rates and 
predicting a softening of monetary policy, devaluation confirms the nature of the exchange 
rate regime as a convertibility regime and pursues the monetary adjustment of balance of 
payments variations. 
 
Appendix no. 1 
Countries belonging to the Franc Zone (rapport de la Zone Franc 2000) 
 
COUNTRY NAME  SINCE  MONETARY UNIONS  POPULATION 
Benin  1960  BCEAO  6,300,000 
Burkina Faso  1960  BCEAO  11,300,000 
Cote d’Ivoire  1960  BCEAO  15,800,000 
Guinea  1997  BCEAO  1,200,000 
Mali  1984  BCEAO  10,800,000 
Niger  1960  BCEAO  10,800,000 
Senegal   1960  BCEAO  9,500,000 
Togo  1960  BCEAO  4,700,000 
Cameroon  1960  BEAC  15,000,000 
Central African Republic  1960  BEAC  3,600,000 
Congo  1960  BEAC  2,900,000 
Gabon  1960  BEAC  1,200,000 
Equatorial Guinea   1985  BEAC  400,000 
Chad   1960  BEAC  7,700,000 
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